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so needful to any true influence over the child's thought and life.

Likewise, one can but wish that the suggestions to parents in Chapter XIX—*Direct Ethical Instruction*—might bear fruit in the hours of intercourse between parent and child, when both are conscious of the purpose in hand. Mr. Griggs says, "The average parent will be much more sure to carry out his part in the work of ethical instruction if he assigns some regular time daily for it. . . . Thus, if the parent can consecrate even a few minutes each evening to quiet talks with his children, sometimes with all together, sometimes with each alone, over the events and action of the day, the work of ethical instruction will grow apace and the results at the end of a year will amaze one who has not previously tried the plan" (p. 216).

The first need of many, if not all, parents is for some wisely selected and well arranged book of materials for moral training. Lacking such help, much assistance may be had from a careful study of the chapters of this book that deal with the use of mythology, literature, history, and the various references to biography as material for moral instruction. To the teacher of literature or history these discussions will be especially significant; and to such teachers is open the first door into the new school which shall aim not simply at mental culture, but more at the development of character in the young.

The motive for moral nurture which animates Mr. Griggs is largely an interest in personal life, the desire that every child shall come to "happy and helpful living": the larger motive—that of democracy—which lies in the imperative social need has not been brought out in this discussion, but from the point of view of personal need, it is not difficult to find one's way to the larger social need, which when realized, must make such books as this valuable as guides in a new educational endeavor, the end of which shall be not only intellectual equipment, but inspiration for the tasks of social life in the growing democracy.

MONTCLAIR, N. J.

LESLIE WILLIS SPRAGUE.

THE PLATONIC CONCEPTION OF IMMORTALITY AND ITS CONNECTION WITH THE THEORY OF IDEAS. By R. K. Gaye. Cambridge University Press. 1904.

Mr. Gaye's object in this book is to investigate the connection between the theory of ideas and the theory of the im-

mortality of the soul as held by Plato, and in this way to make clear the nature of Plato's conception of immortality and to determine in what sense he believed in the continued existence of the individual soul: this subject has involved the consideration of the Platonic conception of the soul and of the relation of soul and body.

Mr. Gaye follows Dr. Jackson in his interpretation of Plato's philosophical development. Indeed, this book is mainly an attempt to prove that those who accept Dr. Jackson's views of the later Platonism must admit that Plato believed the individual soul to be immortal, and in this Mr. Gaye is successful. Indeed, it is plain that whether we accept Dr. Jackson's views or not, Plato did to the last believe in the immortality of individual souls. But Mr. Gaye's attempt to establish his interpretation of this immortality and of the relation of soul to body cannot be regarded as successful.

Mr. Gaye first explains Plato's advance on the earlier views of immortality as regards greater clearness of conception, as shown especially in the "Phædo," which insists upon the immateriality of the soul just as upon the immateriality of the ideas. At this period of his life Plato believed that just as the ideas are immaterial and imperishable and exist in a world apart from particulars, so the soul is immortal and separable from the body and may when existing apart from the body have direct knowledge of the ideas. According to Mr. Gaye, Plato, both at this period and later, did not think that he could prove anything more than that soul is immortal, but that he held it reasonable to suppose that soul is always distributed into the same personalities, and that therefore a belief in individual immortality is not unreasonable. But Mr. Gaye has not explained what personal identity is, nor what Plato thought it was.

Plato, however, in Mr. Gaye's view, became dissatisfied with this earlier position: he found that while insisting upon the immateriality of the ideas and of the soul, he was really materializing both in his doctrine that ideas are immanent in particulars and that the soul is related to body; and that if he was to save the immateriality of the soul and the ideas he must revise his doctrine of the relation of ideas to particulars and of soul to body. It is at this point that Mr. Gaye seems to us to begin to seriously misinterpret Plato. Mr. Gaye attributes Plato's supposed dissatisfaction to the realization of the difficulties urged

in the early chapters of the *Parmenides*, difficulties, the point of which Mr. Gaye interprets to be that relation to space and to things in space necessitates that the entity, idea or soul, so related be itself material. But there is no reason to suppose that this is true; and no reason to suppose that Plato held it to be true: and as regards the difficulties urged in the "*Parmenides*," they are not insoluble; and it is doubtful whether Plato urged them, as Mr. Gaye assumes, as final and irrefutable criticisms of his earlier doctrine and not rather as criticisms the answer to which depends on a clearer conception of what that doctrine is.

However, Mr. Gaye, following Dr. Jackson and Mr. Archer Hind in supposing a revolutionary change in Plato's philosophy, proceeds to elicit from the "*Timaeus*" in the interpretation of which he follows Mr. Archer Hind, Plato's later theory of immortality. It is difficult to explain what this is. Briefly put, it appears to be this: Infinite or absolute mind thinks and thinks according to the ideas which are now only of natural kinds: the product of its thinking are certain finite minds of a high order, which as many are necessarily differentiated in space,—why necessarily?—and certain lower minds, which by the thinking of the higher finite minds are attached to bodies and thus become the living animals of the world, the instances of the natural kinds. Matter, on this theory, is the necessary product of the "pluralization" of infinite mind, since this pluralization necessitates the differentiation of the objects thought by infinite mind in space, which is Plato's matter. Thus, while according to Mr. Gaye and Dr. Jackson, the later Platonism saves the immateriality of the ideas, which are now limited to the ideas of natural kinds, and permanent modes of the operation of supreme mind, it teaches that souls are always necessarily attached to body and can never have full knowledge of the ideas: souls are immortal and by metempsychosis can all attain to the highest state, namely that of man, but can never be freed, as Plato had hoped in his younger days, from the trammels of matter.

The criticism of Mr. Gaye's views involves a criticism of those of Dr. Jackson and Mr. Archer Hind, a difficult and lengthy task, involving detailed discussion of minute points of interpretation, which is here impossible. A few points may, however, be touched upon. First, there seems to be no adequate authority for supposing that Plato held that finite minds can never have

full knowledge of the ideas. Secondly, Dr. Jackson's view of the paradigmatic ideas of the natural kinds, and of the relation of resemblance which particulars have to them, neglects Plato's doctrine that resemblance implies the possession of a common element; and thus does not get over the difficulty of the third man. Thirdly, Dr. Jackson has not explained what is meant by a natural kind. And as regards Mr. Gaye's pursuit of this theory into the question of immortality, it may be pointed out that in lack of a definition of natural kind, Mr. Gaye seems to nullify Dr. Jackson's views that there are ideas of natural kinds. For Mr. Gaye's arguments seem to lead to the conclusion that there is only one idea, the highest, *i. e.*, that of man: for since a natural kind is apparently a kind which is perpetuated by nature, that is one which is always actually represented by instances,—for how else distinguish between man and sophist?—and since Mr. Gaye's view, as he himself realizes, allows of the attainment by all souls to the highest state, namely that of man, it follows that the other kinds are not always represented by instances and are not, therefore, natural kinds any more than is, *e. g.*, sophist a natural kind. Further, Mr. Gaye seems to have failed to realize as clearly as is necessary the outcome of his views that the soul of Plato's later theory is not immaterial. Mr. Gaye's words imply that this materiality is different from the materiality which he asserts, for very questionable reasons, to be involved in Plato's earlier doctrine. But his statement that the later theory is a relative dualism dependent on an ultimate monism does not fully explain the difference between the earlier and later doctrines. Indeed, the whole of the metaphysical interpretation of the "Timaeus," which Mr. Gaye accepts from Mr. Archer Hind, needs a far clearer statement than it has so far received. At present it is impossible to discover whether the finite minds which are differentiated in space and so perceived under the conditions of time and space, are parts of the infinite mind, or are objects of the thinking of infinite mind. They might, of course, be both in the sense that one part might have another part as the object of its thinking: but Mr. Gaye seems to imply that the part which thinks is itself the object which it thinks,—a view which is in itself indefensible and which we have no reason to attribute to Plato. The acceptance, moreover, of one alternative only leads to difficulties. If the finite souls are parts of infinite mind, they are not, as Mr. Gaye says, necessarily

material, since matter only arises as the phenomena of the perception of differentiated souls: and is not necessarily related to souls—unless absolute mind is itself necessarily material, as having parts. And if the souls are objects of the thinking of infinite mind, then the spiritual part of them is different from the material part, and both, if real at all, are equally real: and thus the criticism which Mr. Gaye urges against Plato's earlier conception of the relation of soul to body is as valid against his supposed later view.

It is impossible to criticize this book adequately without a much more minute and lengthy discussion, which is here impossible. The task of criticism is rendered all the more difficult by the fact that to show that Mr. Gaye's interpretation of Plato is inconsistent is not to show that it is wrong: for Plato was not necessarily consistent. The main criticism of the book, however, is that though it makes its points clearly and is for that reason of considerable value for all students of Plato, it has failed to establish satisfactorily that the interpretation of Plato which it adopts is the only possible interpretation, or that Plato was really influenced by the difficulties and arguments by which Mr. Gaye assumes him to have been influenced.

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FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE. Sermons by W. R. Inge, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Hertford College, Oxford; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Lichfield. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1904. Pp. x, 292.

These sermons are thoughtful, scholarly, finely spiritual. I should not think of calling them great or powerful. But they are good—at times quite suggestive, though in places tolerably commonplace. I am more struck with the presence of theological elements than with distinctively ethical appeals, which are by no means wanting. These latter chiefly concern us in this JOURNAL. In one place, for example (p. 60), we find “the truth and reality of the *ought to be*” affirmed, and this latter declared to be “the supreme category of the mind.” In another instance (p. 100), the author insists that “everywhere in Christian ethics, the direction of the *will* is fundamental.”

These sermons have a Preface, and an interesting one—an unusual thing for volumes of sermons. Their author frankly says